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Abstract

One of the duties of the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi - MK) is to determine whether
legislation is consistent with the Constitution. If the MK determines that a statute is inconsistent with the
Constitution, it declares that such statute is invalid. In such instance, the MK has the final word to determine
the validity of legislation. In the view of some scholars, this feature reflects that the MK adopts strong form
of judicial review. While this assertion holds true in some cases, it does not necessarily reflect the complete
feature of the MK’s approach in deciding cases. In some economic and social rights cases, the MK decision
adopts weak form of judicial review. This paper attempts to explain that while constitutionally the MK adopts
strong form of judicial review, in some economic and social rights cases it adopts weak form of judicial review.
Keyword: interpreting, constitutional court, decision, economic and social rights, strong form of judicial
review, weak form of judicial review
Abstrak
Salah satu tugas Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) adalah menentukan apakah suatu undang-undang bertentangan
dengan undang-undang dasar. Apabila MK menentukan bahwa suatu undang-undang bertentangan dengan
undang-undang dasar maka undang-undang tersebut dinyatakan bertentangan dengan undang-undang
dasar. Selanjutnya undang-undang tersebut dinyatakan tidak mempunyai kekuatan hukum mengikat
(invalid). Dalam hal ini MK mempunyai kekuasaan yang final untuk menentukan validitas suatu undangundang. Bagi sebagian ahli, fitur ini menunjukan bahwa MK mengadopsi judicial review yang bersifat kuat
(strong form of judicial review). Meskipun penilaian ini benar untuk beberapa kasus, hal ini tidak serta merta
menggambarkan fitur yang lengkap dari MK. Dalam beberapa kasus terutama judicial review yang berkaitan
dengan hak-hak ekonomi dan hak-hak sosial, MK mengadopsi judicial review yang bersifat lemah (weak form
of judicial review). Artikel ini mencoba menjelaskan bahwa meskipun secara konstitusional MK mengadopsi
judicial review yang bersifat kuat, dalam beberapa kasus yang terkait dengan hak-hak ekonomi dan hak-hak
sosial MK mengadopsi judicial review yang bersifat lemah.
Kata kunci: Menafsir, mahkamah konstitusi, putusan, hak-hak ekonomi dan sosial
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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of constitutional law scholars have discussed several important aspects
of the Indonesian constitutional court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, hereinafter MK).1 They
discuss topics which include the institutional structure of the MK, the work of the
MK over a certain period of time, the writing style of MK decisions, as well as the
leadership of the MK. In short, there are ample scholarly writings about these issues.
This paper, therefore, will not discuss such issues. It will instead discuss how the MK
decides cases of judicial review related to economic and social rights.
Some scholars argue that the MK adopts strong form of judicial review in deciding
cases concerning economic and social rights.2 This is because the MK has the final say
to determine the validity of legislation. Others argue that the court adopts strong form
of judicial review because its decisions go far beyond its constitutional mandates.3
The MK does not only invalidate legislation, it also determines how the legislature
follows up on its decisions. This paper attempts to take a different position as
opposed to what has been written by some constitutional law scholars thus far. While
some scholars believe that the MK adopts a strong form of judicial review, this paper
argues that some of the MK’s decisions in cases related to economic and social rights
can in fact be viewed as the adoption of weak form of judicial review. That said, the
MK does not always use its authority to invalidate a law that is inconsistent with the
Constitution. In certain cases, the MK refrains from interfering with the legislature’s
authority to make/amend law.
The structure of this paper is as follows: to begin with, this paper will briefly
explain the MK’s specific features in relation to its power to conduct judicial review. It
will discuss how the Constitution and the MK Law formally regulate the MK’s power to
conduct judicial review. It will then discuss how in practice the MK’s decisions do not
always reflect what is stated in the legislation. Second, the paper will clarify the term
‘strong form of judicial review’ and ‘weak form of judicial review’. In doing so, the
paper will refer to Mark Tushnet’s piece that explicitly uses this term and sufficiently
explains these two terms. Third, it will briefly elaborate on some existing scholarly
papers that discuss this issue and conclude that the MK adopts strong form of judicial
review. This will be followed by an explanation of this paper’s position that is different
from the existing scholarly papers. This paper will specifically use Mark Tushnet’s
pieces as a reference to prove that in certain cases the MK decisions can be seen as the
adoption of weak form of judicial review. In doing so, it will analyze two MK decisions
on judicial review cases that are closely related to economic and social rights namely
Law on Water Resources and Law on Electricity using Tushnet’s pieces as reference.
Finally, this paper will end with some conclusions.
II. SOME SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE MK’S DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
The MK was established in 2003, a year after the recent constitutional amendments
had been completed (1999-2002). Since then, it has handled many constitutional
cases ranging from general election disputes, disputes of competence among state
institutions, to judicial review. In line with the purpose of this paper, namely to
examine the MK’s approach in judicial review related to economic and social rights,
this paper will primarily focus on the MK’s power to conduct judicial review.
Constitutionally, the MK’s authority to conduct judicial review is stipulated in

1
These include Simon Butt, Petra Stockmann, Hendrianto, Fritz Siregar and Jimly Asshidiqque. This
list is just to name a few. There are other constitutional law scholars who have written on a similar topic.
2
Philippa Venning, “Determination of Economic , Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian Constitutional Court,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 10, no. 1 (2008), pp.100–132.
3
Ibid.
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article 24 C. It states, among other things, that the MK’s authority is to review laws
against the Constitution.4 The same article also determines that the MK’s decision is
final and binding.5 At the legislation level, the MK Law limits the power to conduct
judicial review. The MK can only review laws that are enacted after the recent
constitutional amendments (1999-2002).6 This Law also limits the legal standing of
the parties that can file petitions with the MK.7
In practice, the MK does not necessarily follow the provisions of the Constitution and
legislation. For example, the MK extends its authority from reviewing laws that have
been issued after the constitutional amendments to reviewing any laws regardless of
whether they were enacted before or after the recent constitutional amendments.8 In
other instances, the MK limits legal standing. For example, the Constitution stipulates
that the right to life belongs to every individual (not necessarily Indonesian citizens).
In actual fact, there has been a case where the MK has declined the petition filed by
foreign citizens.9 There has also been a case where the MK loosens the legal standing.
The MK Law stipulates that petitioners should prove that there is a close connection
between the petition and the constitutional damages they suffered. In practice, there
have been cases where the MK accepted a petition in which the connection between
the petition and the constitutional damages was relatively weak. Such has been the
case when the MK accepts a petition based on the argument that the petitioners are
tax payers.10
In regard to the nature of the MK’s decisions, article 24 C of the Constitution states
that the MK’s decisions are final and binding.11 Being final means that the decisions of the
MK cannot be challenged. There is no legal avenue available to appeal against the MK’s
decisions. Being binding means that the MK’s decisions are binding on all individuals
including state institutions once the decision is announced. The MK Law reiterates
this article. In this regard, there is no significant difference between the provisions
of the Constitution and legislation and what the MK’s practices, except for the fact
that the MK has produced several different types of decisions. Simon Butt asserts that
the MK has adopted at least four different techniques besides those prescribed in the
Constitution and the MK Law.12 The four types of decisions are as follows: first, the MK
has declared that its decisions will operate only in the future. This type of decision has
softened the impact of its decisions on other branches of government. Second, the MK
has decided that a law is inconsistent with the Constitution but refused to invalidate
it. In this regard, the MK appears to have considered the great impact of potential
invalidation. Third, the MK has declared a law unconstitutional but did not invalidate
it. The MK, instead, has set a deadline for the legislature to follow up on the MK’s
decision. And finally, the MK has declared a law conditionally constitutional. It means
that such law can be deemed as constitutional to the extent that it is interpreted in a
manner the MK deems to be constitutional.13
Article 24 C (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia.
Ibid.
6
Article 50 of Indonesia, Undang-undang tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi (The Law on Constitutional
Court), UU No. 24 tahun 2003, LN No. 98 tahun 2003, TLN No. 4316 (Law No. 24 of 2004, SG No. 98 of 2003),
hereinafter referred as “2003 MK Law”
7
Article 51 (1) of the 2003 MK Law.
8
Constitutional Court Decision Number 004/PUU-I/2003 regarding judicial review of the Supreme
Court Law No. 14/1985.
9
Constitutional Court Decision Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007; Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court and
Democracy in Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 50.
10
Ibid, pp 54-5.
11
Article 24 C (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
12
Simon Butt, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court: Conservative Activist or Strategic Operator?,” in The
Judicialization of Politics in Asia, ed. Björn Dressel (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 108.
13
Ibid, p.110.
4
5

Volume 7 Number 2, May - August 2017 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 142 ~

INTERPRETING THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

III. TYPOLOGY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review can be explained in several ways. Based on the number of courts
that have the authority to conduct judicial review, judicial review can be categorized
into centralized and decentralized judicial review.14 The centralized model is marked
by the existence of a separate and specialized court, with exclusive or close-toexclusive jurisdiction over constitutional rulings. This model assumes that matters
handled by such court are different from matters handled by ordinary court. This
model is also commonly referred to as the Austrian model, Kelsenian model or the
European model.
Conceptually, this concentrated system was conceived by Kelsen as being “a system of negative legislation.”15 A Constitutional Court does not specifically decide the
validity of statutes on a concrete single fact. Its competence is to conduct abstract review. “By forbidding the ordinary judges to abstain from enforcing the law and granting the power to declare a statute unconstitutional with erga omnes effect to Constitutional Court the judiciary was subject to the law adopted by parliament and at the
same time the primacy of the constitution over the Parliament could be maintained.”16
In practice, there are various reasons for a country adopting a centralized
constitutional court to conduct judicial review. First, the country concerned may have
experienced authoritarian regimes in the past. By establishing a new separate special
court, it is expected that the new court will be more independent because it does
not have any connection with the government in the past. Another reason is that the
existing courts may have become overburdened in carrying out their responsibility.17
Adding more responsibility to the existing courts may not be a good option since
it places an even greater burden on the already overburdened courts. Therefore,
establishing a new separate court may be a more feasible option.
Unlike the centralized model, the decentralized model is characterized by the
authority to engage in constitutional interpretation that is not limited to a single
court. It can be exercised by different courts. In the United States, for example, state
and federal courts exercise constitutional review, and this is seen as inherent to and
an ordinary incident of the more general process of case adjudication.18 Indonesia
is often said to have adopted centralized judicial review. This is based on the fact
that there is only one Constitutional Court to conduct constitutional review of laws
against the Constitution. However, this view provides an incomplete picture. While
it is true that the Constitutional Court has the authority to conduct judicial review,
there is another judicial institution, namely the Supreme Court which also has judicial
review power. The difference is that the Constitutional Court compares laws against
the Constitution and determines whether they are consistent with the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reviews government regulations against the laws that authorize
their adoption. With this unique characteristic, Indonesia does not fit neatly in the
centralized vs. decentralized model.
Based on the timing of conducting it, judicial review can be characterized as abstract
or concrete judicial review.19 When review is conducted prior to the enactment of a
statute, it is often called abstract review. Thus, at the time a statute is enacted it has
already passed judicial review. The French Constitutional Council adopts this model.
14
Vicki C Jackson and Mark V.Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press,
1999), p. 456.
15
Jimly Asshiddiqie. Perihal undang-undang di Indonesia [About Laws and Regulations in Indonesia]
(Jakarta: Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan, 2006), p. 485.
16
Jackson and Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, p. 485.
17
Andy Omara, “Lessons from the Korean Constitutional Court: What Can Indonesia Learn from the Korean Constitutional Court Experience?” Korea Legislation Research Institute research paper, Sejong, 2008.
18
Jackson and Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, p. 485.
19
Ibid.
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Unlike abstract review, concrete review occurs when a review is conducted only after
the enactment and the enforcement of a statute. The U.S. adopts this model.
A more recent typology is strong form vs. weak form of judicial review. Unlike
the first two typologies of judicial review, the weak vs. strong form of judicial review
focuses on whether the court has the final say in determining the validity of laws.
If the court has the final say to invalidate laws, it adopts a strong form of judicial
review. If the court has the power to determine whether a law is consistent with the
Constitution but it does not have the authority to invalidate such law, it adopts a weak
form of judicial review.
This paper will primarily use strong vs. weak form of judicial review typology
to analyze the MK’s in deciding judicial review cases related to economic and social
rights. This typology is believed to be the most appropriate model because it explains
certain possibilities that could occur when the court conducts judicial review in cases
related to economic and social rights, ranging from ‘strong form’ whereby the court
has the final say, to ‘weak form’ where the court can only declare the incompatibility
of the law without the authority to invalidate it.20
The strong vs. weak form of judicial review model has been coined by Mark
Tushnet, a prominent U.S. comparative constitutional law scholar. This model is
originally rooted in ways a constitution recognizes economic and social rights. A
constitution can recognize economic and social rights as nonjusticiable (declaratory)
rights or justiciable rights.21 Economic and social rights are nonjusticiable if they
are recognized or mentioned in the constitution but are not judicially enforceable.22
Rights are justiciable if they are enumerated in the constitution and are judicially
enforceable. 23
Within justiciable rights category, there are two further divisions “weak substantive
rights” and “strong substantive rights.”24 By weak substantive rights, he means that
the court is able to enforce economic and social rights but leaves significant discretion
to the legislature in the realization of such rights.25 Conversely, strong substantive
rights give significant power to the courts to enforce economic and social rights and to
take substantial part in the realization of such rights.26 Under strong judicial review,
the court does not give as much deference to legislative judgments.
In New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and Democracy-Based
Worries,27 Tushnet sets the debate between strong and weak form of judicial review in
a slightly different way. Unlike the model described above, this model focuses on the
extent to which the judiciary implements its constitutional review and enforcement
authority. If “courts’ interpretative judgments are final and unrevisable,” courts
exercise a strong form judicial review.28 However, if courts have the power to interpret
a statute in light of a constitution or they can declare the incompatibility of a statute
under the constitution, but t do not have the power to invalidate such statute, then the
courts apply a weak form of judicial review.29
20
Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
21
Mark Tushnet, “Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review,” Texas Law Review 82 (2003),
pp.1902-1906.
22
Ibid, p.1898.
23
Ibid, p.1902.
24
Ibid, p.1902, 1906
25
Ibid, p.1902.
26
Ibid, p.1906.
27
Mark Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and Democracy-Based
Worries,” Wake Forest Law Review 38 (2003), p.813.
28
Ibid, p 817.
29
Ibid, p.821.
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IV. REVIEW OF SOME SCHOLARLY PAPERS THAT DISCUSS THE MK’S APPROACHES IN
CONDUCTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
There are some scholarly papers that discuss the MK’s approach in conducting
its judicial review power.30 Petra Stockman, for example, discusses the early work
of the Indonesian Constitutional Court after its establishment in 2003.31 Another
scholar, Stefanus Hendrianto, examines the significant roles of the first Chief Justice
of the Constitutional Court in developing this new Court.32 While both articles discuss
broader themes concerning the Constitutional Court, they do discuss also the work of
the Constitutional Court in conducting judicial review.
For the purpose of this paper, however, it utilizes two scholarly papers in particular,
namely Determination of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian
Constitutional Court written by Philippa Venning33 and Indonesia’s Constitutional
Court: Conservative activist or strategic operator? written By Simon Butt34 as the
primary references to understand the MK’s approach in conducting judicial review
including judicial review on laws related to economic and social rights.35 The use of
these two scholarly papers is significant because both papers discuss a similar topic
and draw relatively similar conclusions. This paper, to a certain extent, draws different
conclusions from these two papers. The difference, however, is not necessarily
contradictory.
Venning’s article examines the approach of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court in
conducting judicial review in cases related to economic, social, and cultural rights.
Her article partly uses Mark Tushnet’s weak vs. strong judicial review model as a
reference to understand the MK’s approach. Comparatively, her article also looks at
different approaches employed by Courts in other countries such as South Africa,
India, and the Philippines in dealing with economic, social and cultural rights. Her
article argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court adopts strong form of judicial
review which partly resembles the one adopted by the Philippines’ Supreme Court.
She argues further that the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s approach is significantly
different from the one taken bt the South Africa Constitutional Court. Her argument is
based on the fact that in some judicial review cases on laws related to economic and
social rights, not only did the MK invalidate the laws, it also provided guidance to the
legislature on way in which the MK’s should be followed. Since the MK went too far
beyond its constitutional mandate, namely to declare the law unconstitutional, based
on Venning’s article, the MK adopts strong form of judicial review.
Another scholarly paper written by Simon Butt elaborates on the different
approaches employed by the MK in conducting judicial review. It focuses partly on
examining the two types of the MK’s decisions, namely conditionally constitutional
and conditionally unconstitutional type of decisions. His article argues that while
these two types of decisions seem to prevent the MK to be an activist, this type of
decision in fact enables the MK to become a more activist court in the long run. He
30
These include: Petra Stockmann, The New Indonesian Constitutional Court: A Study Into Its Beginning
and First Years of Work (Jakarta: Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2007); Philippa Venning, “Determination of Economic , Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian Constitutional Court,” Australian Journal of Asian Law
10, no. 1 (2008), pp. 100–132; Butt, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court”; Hendrianto, “From Humble Beginnings to a Functioning Court: The Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2003-2008” (Dissertation, University
of Washington, 2008); Mardian Wibowo, “Justices’ Freedom of Constitutional Interpretation Method in the
Indonesian Constitutional Court, Mimbar Hukum 25, No. 2 (2013), pp.284-299.
31
Stockmann, The New Indonesian Constitutional Court.
32
Hendrianto, “From Humble Beginnings.”
33
Venning, “Determination of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," pp.100–132.
34
Butt, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court,” pp.98-116.
35
Ibid.
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labels these types of decisions as ‘disguised activism’.36 That said, the MK does not
automatically invalidate the laws but it does effect legal change since it requires these
laws to be interpreted in a certain way. In their respective articles, both Venning as
well as Butt use some similar judicial review cases that are closely related to economic
and social rights such as the judicial review of the Law on Electricity and the Law on
Water Resources.
Based on the analysis and conclusions drawn from the two scholarly articles
described above, this paper offers a different explanation. This paper argues that
in conducting judicial review, especially on matters related to economic and social
rights, the MK’s approach has been inconsistent. The MK does not always adopt a
strong form of judicial review in the sense that it automatically invalidates the law
that is contradictory to the Constitution. In some cases, the MK adopts a weak form
of judicial review. That said, the MK does not automatically invalidate a law even
though it declares that such law is inconsistent with the Constitution. The MK gives
an opportunity to the legislature and the executive to comply with the provision of
the Constitution. This paper will show how, in some cases, the MK adopts a weak
form of judicial review. In doing so, it will use two articles written by Mark Tushnet,
namely New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights –and DemocracyBased worried37 and Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review as primary
references.38 These two articles are utilized because they provide the most recent
models of judicial review that explain different approaches of the court in deciding
judicial review cases related to economic and social rights.

V. THE MK’S APPROACH IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS IN TUSHNET’S LENS: WEAK OR STRONG FORM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Tushnet’s article on New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights –and
Democracy– Based Worries explains how weak forms of judicial review try to respond
to the criticisms of strong forms of judicial review that struggle to avoid criticisms of
judicial activism and judicial restraint. Weak forms of judicial review try to protect
liberal rights in a way that reduces the possibility of wrongful interference with the
legislature. This promise, however, may not be fulfilled. Tushnet argues that weak
forms of judicial review are unstable. In the long run weak forms of judicial review
may lead to judicial or parliamentary supremacy.39
His article builds on the discussion of judicial review from distinguishing strong
and weak form of judicial review to identifying several subcategories of weak review.
Through this discussion he examines several approaches of judicial review, including
those used in Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain and South Africa.
This paper uses Tushnet’s article to examine the MK’s approach in conducting
judicial review. This paper would argue that, in some cases, the Indonesian system
may reflect a weak form of judicial review, resembling a system more similar to that
of the South Africa system than the strong review system of the United States.
Scholars who view that Indonesia adopts strong form of judicial review primarily
base their view on the argument that the MK has the final say in determining the
constitutionality of a statute.40 This view is in line with the provisions in the
Constitution stating that the MK has the power to determine the validity of a legislative
Ibid, p. 99.
Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” p. 813.
38
Tushnet, “Social Welfare Rights,” p. 1895.
39
Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” pp. 813-14.
40
Moh Mahfud MD, “Separation of Powers and the Independence of Constitutional Court in Indonesia”
(presentation, the 2nd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
16-18 January, 2011); Butt, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court,” p. 110.
36
37
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statute.41 The MK has the power to declare whether a statute is consistent with the
Constitution and has the ultimate power to invalidate a statute that is contradictory
to the Constitution. This feature resembles the feature of judicial review in the United
States. This paper, however, holds the view that in certain cases, notably in the Water
Resources Law case and the National Budget Law case, the MK used a weak form
of judicial review which resembles the weak form of judicial review implemented in
South Africa.
In Grootboom42, the South African Constitutional Court adopted a weak form
of judicial review which is also referred to as democratic experimentalism.43 The
democratic experimentalism model involves several stages. First, the Court states
the constitutional principles at a high level of abstraction.44 The Court then provides
incomplete principles meaning applied to particular contexts.45 Following that, the
Court asks other branches of government namely the executive and the legislature to
develop and implement their plan in line with the incomplete principle as required by
the Court.46 The Court finally assesses the result of such experiment.47
The following section will use the democratic experimentalism stages described
above to explain how judicial review in the Water Resources Law case resembles the
weak form of judicial review practiced by the South African Constitutional Court. The
Water Resources Law48 was filed with the Constitutional Court on two occasions. The
first set of petitions was filed with the MK in 2004, while the second petition was filed in
2013. In the 2004 petition, the petitioners claimed that the Water Resources Law was
contradictory to Article 33 of the Constitution.49 This was due to the petitioners’ belief
that Water Resources Law opened up the possibility to privatize water resources. The
Water Resources Law allowed the private sector to participate, and impose fee for, the
provision and management of certain types of water resources such as drinking water
and irrigation. The Law also introduced the right to exploit (hak guna usaha) water
resources. The petitioners believed that allowing the private sector to participate
in water resources management was contradictory to Article 33 of the Constitution
which states that: “The land, water and natural resources contained therein shall be
controlled by the State and shall be used to the greatest extent for the welfare of the
people.50” [Unofficial translation]
In this case, the MK started out with the constitutional principles stated at a high
level of abstraction. The MK interpreted Article 33, specifically the phrase ‘controlled
by the State’ as follows: “… provided the state with the mandate to determine policies
and to conduct acts of administration, regulation, management, and supervision in
order to achieve the greatest welfare for the people.”51 This stage is similar to the first
step that was taken by the South African Court in Grootboom, in the sense that the

Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
43
Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” Columbia Law
Review 98 (1998), p. 267.
44
Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review,” p. 822.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid, p.823.
48
Indonesia, Undang-undang tentang Sumber Daya Air (Law on the Water Resources), UU No. 7 tahun
2004, LN No. 32 tahun 2004, TLN No. 4377 (Law No. 7 of 2004, SG No. 32 of 2004).
49
Article 33 (2) (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. “A sector of production which
is vital and affects the livelihood of the people at large shall be under the control of the state” and “water…
shall be under the control of the state and shall be used to the greatest extent for the benefit of the people.”
[Unofficial translation].
50
Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
51
Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No.058 -059-060-063/PUU-II/2004 and No.008/PUUIII/2005, p.514.
41
42
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Court also stated the constitutional principles.
The MK then elaborated on its interpretation breaking it down to more specific
functions:

The operating function of the State is implemented by the government under its authority to issue and revoke permits, licenses, and concessions. The regulatory function is carried out through legislative powers by the DPR (House of Representatives)
and the President, and regulation by the Government. The managing function is carried out through share-holding mechanism and or through direct involvement in the
management of State-owned enterprise or state-owned legal entities as an institutional instrument through state represented c.q. the government uses its control over
resources to be used for the greatest benefit of people’s welfare. Also supervision
function by the State c.q. government in order to supervise and manage so that the
implementation of powers by the state in sectors of vital production and /or dominate the need of many people shall be truly conducted for the greatest welfare of all
people.52

The second stage, as the court in Grootboom offered the specification of requirement
of the plan. Here also the MK offered the conditions that should be fulfilled by the
executive when establishing implementing regulations. Conditions that should be
fulfilled in implementing regulations are as follows: first, the utilization of water may
not disrupt, derogate or reduce the peopl’es right to water. Second, the State must
fulfill the people’s right to water. Third, the utilization of water must take into account
sustainability of the environment. Fourth, water management and water supervision
by the state are absolute in nature. Lastly, in water resources management and
supervision priority should be given to state-owned enterprises or local-owned
enterprises.53
The MK then proceeded to the next stage by asking the executive branch to
implement the above described conditions when establishing implementing
regulations. While giving an opportunity to the executive branch to include such
conditions in its implementing regulations, the MK declared that the constitutionality
of the Law was conditional on such conditions being fulfilled.54 The MK declared that
‘…if this Law in its implementation is interpreted differently from the manner as
intended in the MK’s consideration above, there is a possibility to re-file [this law] for
review (conditionally constitutional).’55
Nine years after the first decision, through the second judicial review of the
Water Resources Law, the MK examined the implementing regulations enacted by the
executive. The MK assessed whether such implementing regulations were compliant
with the MK’s guidance. After assessing the contents of the implementing regulations,
the MK declared that the implementing regulations derived from the Water Resources
Law did not comply with the MK’s guidance. As a result, the MK declared that the 2004
Water Resources Law was unconstitutional.
The judicial review of the Water Resource Law illustrates how the process of
judicial review in this case largely resembles the weak form of judicial review adopted
by the South African Constitutional Court in Grootboom. Similar to Grootboom where
the Court provided guidance to the government in implementing the plan, in the Water
Resources Law case the MK also provided guidance to the government in establishing
implementing regulations. In addition to the above, in the Grootboom case the Court
52
53
54
55
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examined the implementation of the plan. Likewise, in the Water Resources Law
case the Court assessed the implementing regulations issued by the government.
The interaction between the Court and the government in both cases leads to the
possibility of the Court ‘to revise’ its decision. The revisability of the Court’s decision
reflects the weak form of judicial review.
The weak form of judicial review that this paper argues is significant in clarifying
that, in the case of Indonesia, strong form of judicial review is not consistently applied
in every case. Weak form of judicial review may be used by the MK in certain cases.
The use of weak form of judicial review provides certain advantages. Unlike the strong
form of judicial review that may potentially lead to tension between the Court and
branches of government, the weak form of judicial review potentially reduces such
tension. This is because unlike in the strong form of judicial review where the Court
often ends up invalidating the law, in the weak form of judicial review the Court does
not automatically declare that a law is unconstitutional. Rather than that, the Court
provides guidance which can be used by the government to implement its plan. After
the government implements its plan, the Court finally examines the government’s
implementation and declares whether the plan complies with the Court’s guidance.

VI. WILL WEAK FORM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW STAY WEAK IN THE LONG RUN?
In view of the adoption of weak form of judicial review in some judicial review
cases decided by the MK, will such weak form of judicial review stay weak in the long
run? In considering this question, it is important to understand whether weak form
of judicial review is in fact stable. This section will attempt to answer this question
by looking at the MK’s decision in the judicial review of the National Budget Law. In
analyzing this case, Tushnet’s second article entitled Social Welfare rights and the
Forms of Judicial Review will be used as reference.56
In his said article, Tushnet examines the weak and strong form of judicial
enforcement in connection with social welfare rights. He asserts that both forms of
judicial enforcement have certain benefits and drawbacks. Tushnet is particularly
interested in weak form of enforcement because it provides middle course between
strong form of judicial enforcement and non-judicial enforcement. Unlike the
strong form of judicial enforcement where the Court elaborates in great details
what government must do, weak form of judicial enforcement offers guidance from
the Court to the government in planning what the government should do.57 Due to
such cooperation, weak form of judicial enforcement may avoid resistance from the
government. Weak form of judicial enforcement, however, may provide little incentive
to the legislature to comply with the Court’s order.
In weak form of judicial enforcement, the Court initially asks the government
to develop reasonable plans to fulfill its constitutional obligations. Once the plan is
developed, the government implements the plan independently. The Court merely
provides light supervision in the implementation of such plan. The success or the
failure of implementation heavily depends on the willingness of the government to
execute the plan.
It is possible that there is little that happens or nothing happens at all. In this case,
the court will potentially strengthen its order in order to compel the government to
put more effort into the realization of social welfare rights. The Court possibly asks for
a more detailed plan and a deadline for the accomplishment of the goal. The Court, in
this instance, moves from weak form of judicial enforcement to strong form of judicial
enforcement.
56
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Comparatively, in his article, Tushnet uses the Kyalami Ridge58 case and the
U.S.experience in school desegregation59 cases to explain how weak form of judicial
enforcement works in the real world.60 In Kyalami Ridge, the property owner
demanded the government to provide shelter for people who lost their house because
of flood. The Court rejected the petition and declared that the government had the
duty “to devise, fund, implement, and supervise measure to provide relief to those
in desperate need.”61 As long as the government can show its plan to realize its
constitutional obligation, the Court will likely declare that the government complies
with its constitutional obligation. This decision indicates the language of weak form
of judicial enforcement.
The U.S. school desegregation case shows how the court initially adopted weak
form of judicial enforcement but then moved to strong judicial enforcement because
the weak form did not lead to significant change.62 In this case, the Court declared that
segregation of school was unconstitutional. This means that the government must put
efforts to end the practice of school desegregation. The Court did not supervise the
desegregation process. As a result, nothing much happened. The Court then asked the
government to provide a detailed plan and it closely supervised the implementation
of the plan. In this case the Court converted its judicial enforcement from weak to
strong form of judicial enforcement.
The following part will use Tushnet’s argument that the weak form of enforcement
may be prove to be unstable, leading to the adoption of strong form of judicial review63,
to explain the judicial review of the National Budget Law in Indonesia. The National
Budget Law was initially challenged at the MK in 2005. The petitioners claimed that
the Law, in particular with regards to budget allocation for education, was inconsistent
with Article 31 of the Indonesian Constitution. The said article states that “The State
shall prioritize the budget for education at the minimum of 20 percent of the State
Budget and of the Regional Budget in order to fulfill the needs of the implementation
of national education.”64 The 2005 National Budget Law in fact allocated only seven
percent to the educational sector. In this case, the government argued that the word
‘prioritize’ implies that the fulfillment of 20 percent for educational sector can be
carried out gradually, as long as the government progressively makes a reasonable
effort to achieve the intended purpose and reasonably utilize the existing recourse to
realize the intended purpose.65
The MK acknowledged that the legislature and the executive have increased
the percentage of the allocation for educational sector. That increase, however, did
not achieve 20 percent. The MK responded that the constitutional provision on
the allocation of 20 percent for education did not mean that the fulfillment of such
obligation could be carried out gradually. The MK ruled that the 2005 Law on State
Budget violated the Constitution because it failed to meet the 20 percent constitutional
requirement. While the MK declared that the Law was in conflict with the Constitution,
it did not automatically invalidate the existing Law.66 The MK expected that by
58
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60
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pronouncing such decision, the government would fulfill its constitutional obligation
in the 2006 State Budget Law. The said decision also reflected that the MK refrained
from interfering in the legislature’s authority to amend the Law.
In 2005, the MK also made a decision on the 2005 State Budget Law67; it once
again declared that as long as the budget for education did not reach 20 percent, the
State Budget Law would be contradictory to the 1945 Constitution. The MK, however,
would only invalidate provisions related to the education budget, rather than the
entire State Budget Law. As a consequence, the budget for education may be higher
compared to the budget stated in the State Budget Law if there is a surplus of funds or
additional revenue from the 2006 State Budget Law.
This decision reflects the adoption of weak form of judicial enforcement by the
MK. Instead of invalidating the existing Law on the grounds that the Law was in
conflict with the Constitution, the MK maintained the constitutionality of the Law
and provided an opportunity to the government to fulfill its constitutional obligation
through legislative review. In the said decision, the MK did not provide for a detailed
plan, did not determine a time frame and did not require strict supervision of the
government in fulfilling its obligation. The MK’s approach in this case reflects the
characteristics of weak form of judicial enforcement, in that the legislature did not
immediately increase the portion of the budget dedicated to education to 20 percent.
In 2006, two petitions were brought to the MK, namely petitions against the 2006
State Budget Law and the 2003 National Educational System. The petitioners claimed
that the 2006 State Budget Law was in conflict with Article 31 (4) of the Constitution68
because it had allocated only 9.1 percent for the educational sector. They argued that
the government did not demonstrate good faith to fulfill its constitutional obligation.
They also claimed that the government had not respected the MK’s decision in the
2005 State Budget Law case.69 Based on the fact that between 2004 and 2006 the
state budget for education never achieved 20 percent, the MK concluded that there
was no significant effort from the government and the legislature to comply with
their constitutional obligation. The MK warned lawmakers to take the MK’s decision
seriously so that the court would not find it necessary to invalidate the State Budget
Law for its entirety in the future.70 The MK declared that provisions in the 2006 State
Budget which allocated funds for education were unconstitutional. This decision
required the government and the DPR (House of Representatives) to revise the 2006
State Budget Law during the midyear adjustment of the state budget law in order to
comply with the constitutional provision.71 While the lawmakers did revise the 2006
State Budget Law, and increased the percentage of educational fund allocation, such
increase did not fulfill the MK’s decision.
In regard to the National Educational System, the petitioners claimed that
the exclusion of teachers’ salaries from the 20 percent educational budget was
unconstitutional. The MK concluded that teachers’ salaries should be included in
calculating the educational funds. The inclusion of salary increased the percentage of
educational funds. The MK concluded that because the inclusion of salary would help
the government achieve the 20 percent constitutional requirement, there should be
no further excuse for not fulfilling such constitutional requirement.
In 2008 a similar petition was brought to the Court. In this case the petitioners
claimed that the 2008 Amended State Budget Law which allocates 15.6 percent for
education was even smaller than that in the 2005 State Budget Law.
67
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education did not meet the 20 percent constitutional requirement.72 The MK once
again declared that the provisions concerning the 15.6 percent educational fund
allocation was unconstitutional. The MK also warned lawmakers to fulfill their
constitutional obligation, failing which the MK would invalidate the Law in its entirety.
The MK used the same language to compel lawmakers to abide by its decision. In
the said decision, the MK also determined a time frame for the government to fulfill
its obligation. Lawmakers were required to fulfill their constitutional obligation by
allocating 20 percent of the national budget to the educational sector by no later than
the 2009 State Budget Law. The government frequently used poor financial conditions
resulting from the financial crisis as an excuse for not complying with the MK’s
decision. In its decision, the MK declared that the benchmark of 20 percent would
have to be complied with in the 2009 State Budget Law. It was an important matter
in order to avoid the Law being declared unconstitutional in its entirety. Eventually,
the 2009 State Budget Law achieved 20 percent allocation for the educational sector.
The MK’s decisions in the above described cases were not appropriately followed
up by the government as reflected in the follow up on its decisions in the State Budget
Law cases in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. While the MK acknowledged that
there was gradual increase in the budget allocation for education, such increase did
not meet the constitutional requirement. It appears that there has been a consistent
constitutional violation. The 2006 MK decision demonstrates how the court shifted
from the weak form of judicial enforcement to strong form of judicial enforcement.
Unlike the 2005 decision where the MK provided an opportunity to the government
and the DPR (House of Representatives) to fulfill their constitutional obligation, in
the 2006 decision the MK observed that there had been no significant efforts on part
of the government and the DPR (House of Representatives) to comply with their
constitutional obligation. The MK consequently invalidated the provisions related to
budget allocation for education and required the government to revise the 2006 State
Budget Law specifically in view of the provisions concerning the educational sector.
The MK also determined a time frame in its 2008 decision in the National Budget Law
case ordering that the requirement of 20 percent allocation for education be included
in the 2009 National Budget Law.

VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis of the two judicial review cases considered, namely
the Water Resources Law and the National Budget Law described above, it can be
concluded that: first, the MK’s approach in deciding judicial review cases related to
economic and social rights, as reflected in the Water Resources Law case and the
National Budget Law case respectively, can be interpreted as the adoption of weak
form of judicial review. The judicial review of the Water Resources Law illustrates
that the process of judicial review in this case largely resembles weak form of judicial
review whereby the MK provided guidance to the government for implementing
the latter’s plan. The MK also assessed the implementing regulations issued by the
government. The interaction between the MK and the government in this case may
lead to the possibility of the MK ‘to revise’ its decision. The revisability of the MK’s
decision reflects the weak form of the judicial review.
Second, this paper has also proved that Tushnet’s argument that weak form
of judicial enforcement in the long run is likely to shift to strong form of judicial
enforcement can be used to explain the judicial review of the State Budget Law in
Indonesia. In this case the weak form of judicial review emerged when the MK
declared that the State Budget Law was inconsistent with the Constitution while
it refrained from invalidating the Law. Such decision of the MK was based on the
72
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expectation that the legislature would amend the Law in order for it to be consistent
with the Constitution. In actual fact, the MK’s expectation did not materialize. The
MK subsequently moved from weak form of judicial review to strong form of judicial
review. In this case, the MK determined a time frame for the fulfillment of its decision.
This paper has also proved that the promise that weak form of judicial enforcement
would resolve problems associated with strong form of judicial enforcement or
problems associated with non-judicial enforcement seems difficult to be achieved.
In this instance, Tushnet’s theory appears to be correct in that the form of judicial
enforcement eventually changes to from weak to strong form of judicial enforcement.
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